

Strategic Rescue

Vectoring Airpower Advocates to Embrace the Real Value of Personnel Recovery

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
Few Airmen would dispute the intrinsic importance of rescuing comrades in distress. Stories of selfless efforts to recover downed personnel are rooted in US military lore, most strikingly in Southeast Asia and Somalia. This article suggests that although airpower advocates generally identify with the tactical rescue mission, they often fail to understand its inherent strategic value as part of the broader personnel recovery (PR) function. This needs to change.

Current US policies clearly define the necessity for and strategic purpose of a concerted approach to rescuing people in physical distress, especially where America's security interests are at risk.¹ These policies identify the beneficial effects that a nation with organic rescue capability creates within the international community.² To fulfill this national policy, the

Department of Defense (DOD) tasks the Air Force to employ dedicated rescue forces to perform global PR, which requires a holistic approach towards organizing, mobilizing, and conducting rescue responses that can systematically recover and then return all isolated personnel.³ Although some of these expectations resulted from top-down initiatives, we should note that PR professionals effectively climbed many bureaucratic walls to nudge the US government towards placing strategic emphasis on PR. Airpower advocates now have a strategic rescue capability that joins strategic attack; global reach; persistent

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intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and other airpower competencies to counter our adversaries' efforts to influence our way of life. It is up to these same advocates to maximize the emerging potential of what we might term "strategic PR."

The Rise of Strategic Personnel Recovery

The United States needs new strategic emphasis on PR due to the advent of today's overseas contingency operations and continuing emphasis on the need to conduct major combat operations, in addition to the necessity of dissuading America's adversaries while stabilizing war-torn populations. We must reduce the operational and political risks that stem from captivity and hostage situations. The US government now takes a more proactive and unified approach to mitigating these risks to individuals who conduct official business abroad, including all Airmen who serve overseas. The term *isolated personnel* reflects this strategic emphasis, as defined in joint doctrine: "Those US military, DOD civilians, and DOD contractor personnel (and others designated by the President or Secretary of Defense . . .) who are separated (as an individual or group) from their unit while participating in a US-sponsored military activity or mission and who are, or may be, in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape."⁴

Consequently, the Air Force's rescue force has evolved beyond the traditional images of recovering downed aircrews or rescuing special operations forces from behind enemy lines. A force capable of combat search and rescue, the highly complex operational capability employed to recover these personnel, facilitates the execution aspect of a broader PR function that also includes preparation, response, and adaptation. The Air Force has effectively developed the rescue force into the service's PR experts. Rescue is now a highly adaptable resource that can mitigate the operational

and political costs created when an adversary exploits isolated personnel to generate propaganda, gain intelligence, or restrict their physical freedom of action or maneuver. This makes Air Force rescue forces a key component of the US government's "whole-of-government" approach to recovering isolated personnel across the range of military operations, including the concept of building partnership capacity. Despite rescue forces' high operations tempo and the DOD's impending budget cuts, the Air Force must continue to lead PR efforts by addressing a pressing need for rescue preparation, response, and adaptation before, during, and after a crisis, respectively.

On 1 February 2011, headlines in newspapers worldwide proclaimed "Dept of State Issues Worldwide Caution for U.S. Citizens Anywhere."⁵ Americans have always been at risk in war zones and lawless lands, from Iraq and Afghanistan to Somalia. Has our world become a place where Americans are really threatened "anywhere," from Olympics sites to sandy beaches? The international security environment continues to change unpredictably, increasing Americans' chances of encountering terrorist action and violence throughout the world. Adversaries target venues, both official and private, ranging from embassies and sporting events to business offices and places of worship. Public transportation has a high potential for attack—buses, subways, trains, aircraft, and cruise ships have all come under terrorist scrutiny. Confronted by these shadowy dangers, Americans can either hide within the United States or refuse to give in to these threats. Those who choose the latter course may do so with greater confidence, interacting with the world as beacons of freedom, if they know that their country will support them. This is just one reason that we conduct PR. To an even greater degree than most military missions, PR arises from a complex mix of motivations ranging from realistic statecraft to moral obligation. In making a case for adopting a broader view of PR, this article illuminates some of these motivations.

Historical Reinforcement

A selective look at the long history of the United States' PR operations is revealing. Search and rescue operations during the Vietnam War were a phenomenon peculiar to American involvement: "Few other nations, faced with similar conditions of warfare, would have developed such an extensive rescue capability. Even fewer nations could have afforded it."⁶ The value that the American military places on human life, even at the expense of losing rescue forces, originates in Western philosophies that stress the cohesive nature of society as reflected in American religious and social

guys behind. So I took the sling off my arm and went on back out. . . .

. . . I was determined to keep my promise that this battalion would never leave any man behind on the field of battle, that everyone would come home.⁹

Both the Soldier's Creed and Airman's Creed reinforce this ethos, declaring that a Soldier will never leave a fallen comrade and that an Airman will never leave another Airman behind.

Dr. Earl Tilford, a noted historian of search and rescue in Vietnam, asks in the wake of the famous yet costly rescue of Bat 21, "Was one man's life worth more than the lives of two OV-10 crewmembers, five

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background.⁷ Indeed, al-Qaeda in North Africa offers enormous sums of money to any terrorist group that turns over Westerners—as long as they are not Americans. Al-Qaeda understands America's clear commitment to recovering its people, by forcible means if necessary.⁸ Furthermore, a pervasive and often stated aspect of the American warrior ethos asserts that we will never leave a comrade behind, dramatically illustrated in Col Hal Moore's book *We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young*:

We had been taught never to leave any wounded or dead on the battlefield. . . . We located Taft, dead. While bringing him back we saw another soldier who had been left behind. . . . Gell and I went back again and we picked up the other man. . . .

. . . The more I sat there the more I realized that I couldn't in good faith get on a chopper and fly out of there and leave those

crewmen in the HH-53, and the crew of the Army Huey chopper that were lost during the rescue operation?"¹⁰ Specifically, on 2 April 1972, the navigator of an unarmed EB-66 electronic jamming aircraft found himself on the ground in the midst of an invading North Vietnamese force of over 30,000. The other five crew members perished in the shoot-down. The survivor evaded capture for 12 days while hundreds of personnel from all services, including the Coast Guard, searched for him in what *Stars and Stripes* called the "biggest U.S. air rescue effort of the war."¹¹ The object of that rescue effort, Lt Col Iceal Hambleton, often asked himself if his life was worth the effort. However, given the chance to rescue one of our own, few of our personnel would not risk their lives to save a comrade's.

Team members feel a responsibility to the team rather than to the individual. Cit-

ing Gen S. L. A. Marshall's book *Men against Fire*, Victor Davis Hanson points out that "Americans fought simply to survive at the unit level, at most to protect and save their friends on the left and right, not for higher notions of good versus evil."¹² Veterans of the war in Southeast Asia noted that their South Vietnamese allies, on the other hand, "had to depend on their own ingenuity at evasion to get them safely back to friendly territory."¹³ The South Vietnamese had neither the same philosophy about rescue nor the extensive resources available for a dedicated rescue complex.

The value placed on a single American life did not change over the two decades since Vietnam. Service members in that conflict and others speak movingly about the American attitude towards rescue. For example, CWO Michael Durant, held captive in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993, has the following to say about his nation's culture: "The acts described in these pages appear unique in many ways, but they have been repeated throughout our proud history in the countless displays of courage and sacrifice that are the hallmarks of the American patriot."¹⁴ Eighteen Americans died on a fateful day in October during the "Battle for Mogadishu," during which Durant was captured. The Somalis shot down two Blackhawk helicopters attempting to rescue Americans. Two Air Force pararescuemen, Scott Fales and Tim Wilkinson, received the Air Force Cross for fast-roping to one crash site under intense fire to save the wounded; moreover, two Delta snipers, Randy Shughart and Gary Gordon, volunteered to attempt a rescue of the other downed aircrews against overwhelming odds, making the ultimate sacrifice. Recognizing that they could manipulate American values for their own ends, the Somalis did not kill Durant; they understood the strategic benefits of negotiating for his life rather than taking it.

Functional Complexity

The value placed upon human life makes PR a highly complex operation focused on a time-sensitive target that airpower must recover rather than destroy. The perceived costs of failure are high. Success and speed go hand in hand, but the complexity of the PR cycle makes it difficult for a joint force commander to reduce rescue response time across an area of operations. Not only must the recovery force be organized, trained, and equipped to respond but also the command and control element must have established an efficient PR architecture that facilitates time-critical response, thereby complementing the capability of isolated personnel to assist in their own recovery. Preparation of commanders and staffs, rescue forces, and isolated personnel then joins with extensive planning, execution of the rescue mission, and adaptation of lessons learned in order to further affect mission success. After the rescue of Bat 21, Brig Gen R. G. Cross Jr., deputy director of air operations at Military Assistance Command-Vietnam commented, "As airmen or soldiers or sailors we should expect that there are times when as one person, we must be sacrificed for the overall."¹⁵ We turn to national policy to determine when this sacrifice is appropriate or, better yet, when it is not appropriate for national security.

National Policy

"The United States Government remains committed to the safe and rapid recovery of private Americans and United States Government personnel taken hostage or isolated overseas."¹⁶ America has emphasized PR by developing an annex to National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) 12, which includes prevention of, preparation for, and response to isolating events. It recognizes an adversary's desire to weaken our national will and threaten international security with events that fund insurgencies, criminal groups, and terrorist organizations. The increased presence of Americans

abroad and the dynamics of irregular warfare require the United States to develop an effective PR infrastructure and a coordinated response to isolating events, thus driving national policy's above-mentioned strategic objectives for PR: prevention, preparation, and response.¹⁷ Prevention decreases the vulnerability of US personnel abroad by leveraging education and training resources. Preparation concentrates on at-risk individuals who need an understanding of PR processes; the development of plans and procedures, including knowledge of the risk environment; education and training in surviving captivity, minimizing exploitation, and enabling recovery; and either building or leveraging the infrastructure necessary to mount an effective response. Response, which simply entails execution of the preparation for an isolating event, requires the strengthening and further integration of existing PR mechanisms, including the reintegration process that follows the incident.¹⁸

Most importantly, NSPD 12 offers implementation guidance that vectors the whole-of-government approach to PR. According to Amb. Charles Ray, deputy assistant secretary of defense for POW / missing personnel affairs, "The difficulties our government encounters in interagency cooperation usually stem from divergent departmental policies and different institutional cultures. . . . How can we really expect cohesion under those circumstances?"¹⁹ The annex to NSPD 12 gives the entire US government a common policy and language, guiding every department towards three strategic PR objectives: prevention of, preparation for, and response to isolating events. It contains 68 implementation tasks, of which 29 directly involve the DOD. The annex begins with a simple renaming of the Hostage Working Group to the Hostage and Personnel Recovery Working Group, a change that ensures a broadened perspective on hostage taking with the goal of institutionalizing PR. Implementing prevention in accordance with guidance from the NSPD 12 annex includes an evaluation of current personal security,

force protection, and PR education and training. Directions for implementing preparation identify the need to establish a baseline for all departments and agencies, including the prioritizing of at-risk locations for PR education/training, defining the need for this education/training, and assessing the interoperability of education/training already available within the US government. National policy expects improvements to leverage existing education/training programs.²⁰ This expectation ties directly to response, the third objective, insofar as policy requires the strengthening and further integration of existing PR response mechanisms with the goal of integrating capabilities into a unified national PR system. For postincident response, the DOD must assist other departments and agencies, as well as partner nations as appropriate, in developing reintegration policies and programs.²¹

Evidence of the national PR policy is apparent throughout Pres. Barack Obama's national security strategy, which addresses America's enduring interests such as the value of life; the security of US citizens, allies, and partners; respect for universal values at home and around the world; and an international order that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through cooperation to meet global challenges.²² The universal value of saving lives lies at the heart of these interests, and employment of the military component of PR supports the effective use and integration of American power, which occurs during prevention of, preparation for, and response to isolating events as specified in defense PR policy.

Defense Policy

Former secretary of defense Robert Gates focused his national defense strategy on a unified approach to planning and implementing policy extrapolated from the broader national policy. He recognized that military success alone is not sufficient for achieving national objectives, stating that he did not

want the DOD to allow important “soft power” capabilities, often viewed as preparation for and response to isolating events, to atrophy or disappear.²³ Adm Michael Mullen’s national military strategy further articulates this position, recognizing the necessity of applying military power in concert with other instruments of statecraft: “In this multi-nodal world, the military’s contribution to American leadership must be about more than power—it must be about our approach to exercising power.”²⁴ Admiral Mullen envisions a military capable of exercising power gradationally, breaking things and taking lives only when necessary. History has proven the DOD incapable of consistently meeting this intent with respect to rescue capabilities despite the thousands of lives saved by American rescue forces through the end of the Vietnam War. Indeed, the Navy disestablished its HC-7 unit in 1975 as the service’s only active duty rescue organization, while the Air Force’s Air Rescue and Recovery Service reached noncapable status in 1986. Operation Desert Storm then caught the US military without an effective conventional rescue capability in 1990, a situation further complicated by the lack of an overarching theater rescue command and control structure.²⁵ A defense policy highlighting the need for PR capabilities prevents the United States from again learning this lesson the hard way.

The DOD emphasized its PR policies in 2009 by publishing DOD Directive 3002.01E, *Personnel Recovery within the Department of Defense*, which outlines overarching guidance for the department in building PR capacity and developing capabilities to ensure that the DOD can provide the military-response component of PR identified in national policy:

Preserving the lives and well-being of U.S. military, DoD civilians, and DoD contractor personnel authorized to accompany the U.S. Armed Forces who are in danger of becoming, or already are, beleaguered, besieged, captured, detained, interned, or otherwise missing or evading capture . . . while partici-

pating in U.S.-sponsored activities or missions, is one of the highest priorities of the Department of Defense.²⁶

The DOD also acknowledges that it has an obligation to train, equip, and protect its personnel, prevent their capture and exploitation by adversaries, and reduce the potential for leveraging isolated personnel against US interests. The department expects commanders to maintain situational awareness of all personnel during military operations, linking force protection programs and PR as a means of preserving the force.²⁷ In line with national policy, the DOD will not support payment of ransom or grant concessions for the return of any of its personnel, with the exception of honoring compensation obligations from the use of a blood chit.²⁸

A Whole-of-Government Approach

Developing PR capabilities inside the DOD is part of the US equation to account for the strategic value of PR, but we need something more—specifically, an inter-agency whole-of-government approach. The national security strategy highlights the fact that fostering coordination across the departments and agencies demands more effective alignment of resources and improvements in education and training.²⁹ Beyond this requirement, President Obama calls for the military to continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign states, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties.³⁰ At the same time, the United States will nurture economic and financial transactions for mutual economic benefit while intelligence and law enforcement agencies cooperate with other governments to anticipate events, respond to crises, and provide safety and security.³¹ PR plays a major role by linking the military and other US agencies in addressing these last few issues, ranging from defense support to civil authorities within the homeland to humanitarian assistance and disaster

relief operations abroad. The US military's PR capacity is part of the soft power that strengthens the whole-of-government approach to future conflict and crises by enabling the United States to gain what it wants through cooperation and attraction as opposed to hard power's use of coercion and payment.

PR also supports a whole-of-government approach to deterrence. A robust deterrence policy blends economic, diplomatic, and military tools to influence the behavior of potential adversaries.³² Traditional perspectives recognize that threatening the use of force can prove just as effective as applying force in order to prevent an adversary from attaining an objective contrary to American desires.³³ We can deter an adversary by developing a closer relationship with him and thus avoid conflict. Furthermore, combining PR capability with economic and diplomatic tools in a nonthreatening manner offers another state the lifesaving opportunities it may have never considered. In this scenario, another state relies on the United States' military power for PR at the onset of preparation for disaster relief. In the event of an actual crisis, the state requests US assistance. The Japanese disaster of March 2011 illustrates the use of PR to shore up international relations. Since Japan and the United States are democracies and allies, the possibility of their going to war with each other remains low. However, friendly states still occasionally pursue conflicting objectives that cause tension which, if not defused through existing linkages, might escalate into counterproductive courses of action. When the earthquake and subsequent tsunami struck northern Japan, the United States responded with all available rescue forces at the same time the Japanese openly asked for American help. Neither of these actions would have occurred without prior effort to integrate both states' lifesaving capabilities and avoid force posturing. Once the populace recognizes that this capability exists, it will expect the same level of coverage from its own government in the future.

Humanitarian assistance has another key benefit: saving a life can make friends for life. Saving one life affects that person's family, friends, acquaintances, and even the local government, thus having an inordinately advantageous effect on the "hearts and minds" of the populace. This can happen even in unlikely places, as was the case in Iran following the devastating earthquake there in December 2003.³⁴ Regarding US assistance to Pakistan after the earthquake that hit Kashmir in 2005, Admiral Mullen remarked, " 'We started showing them a side of American power that wasn't perceived as frightening, monolithic, or arrogant.' That is what rescue can bring to the table on behalf of the Air Force."³⁵ Further, the increased confidence in and dependence on the government to protect and save lives instill mutual respect and reduce the breeding grounds for insurgency and terrorism.³⁶

The DOD is a key actor in implementing the president's guidance. Secretary Gates wanted to develop and refine the department's PR capabilities with innovative means, concepts, and organizations, seeking flexibility and speed via the use of all government assets in response to isolating events. We will tailor our capabilities, concepts, and organizations to the demands of our complex international environment, which often features asymmetric challenges. The former secretary of defense therefore required an expanding understanding of jointness that seamlessly combines our agencies' civil and military capabilities. Specifically, Secretary Gates wanted to consider realigning DOD structures, as well as interagency planning and response efforts, to better address risks and meet needs.³⁷ As addressed in the national PR policy, we must rescue and return isolated Americans, regardless of whether we do so by means of the diplomatic, military, or civil component of PR.

Building Partnership Capacity

President Obama identifies “combating violent extremism; stopping the spread of nuclear weapons . . . ; and forging cooperative solutions to the threat of climate change, armed conflict, and pandemic disease” as major national interests that cross borders.³⁸ A goodwill gesture such as saving lives by finding cooperative solutions with partner nations can promote lasting partnerships or future alliances: “Each life saved communicates our values instead of the enemy’s values, and strengthens faith in our nation and in those states who partner with us.”³⁹ These states will become our closest allies—countries that the United States will depend upon in addressing global and regional security crises which affect other common interests. As the national security strategy notes, “Where governments are incapable of meeting their citizens’ basic needs and fulfilling their responsibilities to provide security within their borders, the consequences are often global and may directly threaten the American people.”⁴⁰ Humanitarian crises offer a perfect example of events that, left unaddressed, will overwhelm a government and influence the international community. The strategy specifies the need to foster long-term recovery from these events. Leaving American agencies deployed in support of a humanitarian crisis without a reasonable expectation of their relief by the state receiving the support does not fulfill this objective. We can use PR as a theater security engagement tool to assist in this process.⁴¹

The national military strategy of 2011 describes a multinodal world characterized more by interest-driven coalitions based on diplomatic, military, and economic power as opposed to security competition between opposing forces. Much of this transition stems from a growing global population and the demand it places on Earth’s resources: “The uncertain impact of global climate change combined with increased population centers in or near coastal environ-

ments may challenge the ability of weak or developing states to respond to natural disasters.”⁴² The national military strategy dedicates an entire section to strengthening international and regional security through theater security cooperation and humanitarian assistance for the purpose of developing international interoperability before crises occur, thereby maximizing collaboration before lives hang in the balance. The need to save people’s lives, regardless of their nationality, can drive erstwhile adversaries to build trust and confidence during humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief activities. These efforts will gain and maintain access to an otherwise closed nation, developing a relationship to support broader national interests.⁴³

The increased probability of Americans becoming isolated around the globe and the worldwide impact of natural and/or man-made disasters motivated Secretary Gates’s desire to have the DOD work with allies to improve military capabilities, with emphasis on training, education, and the building of partner capacity when appropriate.⁴⁴ In the national military strategy, Admiral Mullen adds the expectation that partnerships can withstand political upheavals or even disruption.⁴⁵ The military component of PR allows us to meet these expectations. PR offers a perfect example of the US armed forces developing foreign capabilities as a critical component of global engagements with collective security benefits. A global response to saving lives requires investment in regional capabilities: “Regional organizations can be particularly effective at mobilizing and legitimating cooperation among countries closest to the problem.”⁴⁶ The military component of PR can partially realize President Obama’s expectation that the United States enhance regional capabilities by developing a division of labor among local, national, and global institutions. PR does not exist as a completely military function, but the military does provide a level of expertise that the nation can continue calling upon in pursuit of America’s interests.

What Does Personnel Recovery Achieve?

National and defense policies do not stipulate the point at which saving a human life is not worth the cost in resources expended. However, these policies do provide for a whole-of-government and partnership organized approach to prevent or hinder adversaries from realizing four key objectives:

1. Gaining strategic advantage from a tactical event in order to weaken national will and increase risks to a free/open society.
2. Influencing international partners to withdraw from US-led coalitions and withhold support of US policy.
3. Degrading America's international image by increasing an adversary's strength and operational capability.
4. Affecting the availability of operational manpower due to loss of life, combat ineffectiveness from injury, removal of the will to fight, or refusal to accept tactical risk.⁴⁷

PR can prevent our adversaries from having a significant effect on national security. The national defense strategy says that the military will work with other US departments and agencies, state and local governments, partners and allies, and international and multilateral organizations in pursuit of national objectives: "A whole-of-government approach is only possible when every government department and agency understands the core competencies, roles, missions, and capabilities of its partners and works together to achieve common goals."⁴⁸ PR serves as a common goal for the United States and its allies. For that reason, the DOD has recently paid more attention to PR by designating a lead agent.

Conclusion

PR is a DOD function primarily because America values human life and because loyalty to comrades is the bedrock of military culture. These facts will never change, nor should they. We can more easily understand the emphasis that military members place on life through the countless examples of heroism immortalized in Medal of Honor citations and military lore. Our heroes, both living and deceased, are among a large group of warriors who would have given their lives for another team member had they found themselves in the same situation. People not involved with such missions, however, have questions about a policy that may cost rescuers their lives. Beyond these noble motivations, the United States conducts PR because it has strategic value beyond the tactical level. The United States faces a threat from adversaries who weaken national will and jeopardize international security by exploiting captured Americans and allied personnel. These adversaries run the gamut from insurgents to criminal groups to terrorists. The threat has become such a security concern that the United States has established policy for the prevention of, preparation for, and response to isolating events. DOD policy recognizes PR as one of the department's highest priorities because "any one prisoner, military or civilian, can be that dreaded publicity nightmare, beheaded by hooded fanatics bereft of humanity."⁴⁹ Through whole-of-government and building-partnership-capacity approaches, the United States conducts PR to stop or mitigate an adversary's attempts to gain strategic advantage, influence international partners, degrade America's international image, and affect operational resources. Clearly, airpower advocates should embrace their strategic rescue force and the value that PR offers beyond tactical operations. ✪

Notes

1. National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) 12, 2008; and Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3002.01E, *Personnel Recovery within the Department of Defense*, 16 April 2009.
2. DODD 2310.2, *Personnel Recovery*, 22 December 2000.
3. Air Force Doctrine Document 3-50, *Personnel Recovery Operations*, 1 June 2005.
4. Joint Publication 3-50, *Personnel Recovery*, 5 January 2007, I-1.
5. See the Emergency Email and Wireless Network, <http://www.emergencyemail.org/newsemergency/anmviewer.asp?a=878>.
6. Earl H. Tilford Jr., *Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1980), 116.
7. George Galdorisi and Tom Phillips, *Leave No Man Behind: The Saga of Combat Search and Rescue* (Minneapolis: MBI Publishing, 2008), 431.
8. Tiemoko Diallo, "Al Qaeda Holding Europeans Taken in Mali—Military," Reuters, 29 January 2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSLT774538>.
9. Lt Gen Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Gallo-way, *We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young* (New York: Random House, 1992), 88, 207, 213.
10. Tilford, *Search and Rescue*, 118.
11. Darrel D. Whitcomb, *The Rescue of Bat 21* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 2.
12. Victor Davis Hanson, *The Soul of Battle: From Ancient Times to the Present Day; How Three Great Liberators Vanquished Tyranny* (New York: Free Press, 1999), 456n87.
13. Tilford, *Search and Rescue*, 117.
14. Michael J. Durant, *In the Company of Heroes* (New York: Penguin Group, 2003), vi.
15. Tilford, *Search and Rescue*, 119.
16. NSPD 12.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Charles A. Ray (remarks to the 2009 SERE [survival, evasion, resistance, and escape] Specialist Graduation Ceremony, Spokane, WA, 12 June 2009).
20. NSPD 12.
21. Ibid.
22. White House, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: Office of the President of the United States, May 2010), 7.
23. US Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, June 2008), 17. The term *soft power* was coined by Joseph S. Nye Jr. of Harvard University in his book *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990). He further developed the concept in *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
24. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), 5.
25. Galdorisi and Phillips, *Leave No Man Behind*, 465–86.
26. DODD 3002.01E, *Personnel Recovery*, 2.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid. A blood chit, a sheet of material depicting an American flag, includes statements in several languages explaining that anyone assisting the bearer of the chit will be compensated upon the return of the individual and presentation of the claim to an agent of the US government.
29. White House, *National Security Strategy*, 14.
30. Ibid., 11.
31. Ibid.
32. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy*, 8.
33. Many theorists approach deterrence with a perspective on nuclear weapons and the use of lethal force. Bernard Brodie observes that maximum deterrence is created by the ability to target enemy societies/cities while protecting our own, as supported by a decision maker's credibility (*Strategy in the Missile Age* [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959]). Lawrence Freedman sees deterrence as convincing an adversary not to take specific actions, based on a legitimate threat of reprisal if he does (*The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* [London: Macmillan Press, 1981]). Thomas Schelling sees deterrence as a bargaining strategy that doesn't involve expending power because of the threat of harm (*The Strategy of Conflict* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960]).
34. The 81-member United States Agency for International Development (USAID) / Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) arrived in-country via C-17 and C-130 aircraft on 30 December, and all had departed by 14 January 2004. In Bam, the USAID/DART team conducted need and structural assessments while its field hospital treated 727 patients, 30 percent of whom had earthquake-related injuries. "Assistance for Iranian Earthquake Victims," USAID, <http://www.usaid.gov/iran/>.
35. Lt Col Marc C. DiPaolo et al., "A Rescue Force for the World: Adapting Airpower to the Realities of the Long War," *Air and Space Power Journal* 21, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 84.
36. The author witnessed this effect during a 2006 rotation in Afghanistan. He launched on a rescue mission responding to a call to help a young

Afghan girl injured during an engagement between the coalition and insurgents. Rescue forces evacuated both the critically injured girl and her father to an American hospital and visited them a couple of days later. Their action saved her life, and her father declared, "I love America."

37. US Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy*, 17–18.

38. White House, *National Security Strategy*, 3.

39. Ray, remarks.

40. White House, *National Security Strategy*, 26.

41. *Ibid.*, 41.

42. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy*, 2.

43. *Ibid.*, 15.

44. US Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy*, 16.

45. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy*, 6.

46. White House, *National Security Strategy*, 46.

47. Col Glen H. Hecht, USAF (comments during development of the Air Force PR Operational Concept, Langley AFB, VA, 2009). Colonel Hecht was chief of the Air Combat Command Personnel Recovery Division following assignments to the DOD POW / Missing Personnel Office and Joint Personnel Recovery Agency as well as operational and tactical assignments flying the HH-60.

48. US Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy*, 17–18.

49. Galdorisi and Phillips, *Leave No Man Behind*, 527.



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